

PROGRESS UPDATE ON THE KERSLAKE REPORT

A report by Andy Burnham, Mayor of Greater Manchester, outlining progress against the Kerslake recommendations following the Manchester Arena attack

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FOREWORD

Following the devastating terrorist attack at the Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017, as Mayor of Greater Manchester and in my role as the Police and Crime Commissioner, I commissioned Lord Kerslake and a panel of experts to conduct an independent review of Greater Manchester's preparedness for and response to the attack.

I asked Lord Kerslake to place the experiences of those directly affected at the heart of the review and to advise me of those aspects of the preparedness and response that were effective, together with steps which might be taken to address any areas that could be strengthened or improved. The findings of the panel were published in The Kerslake Report on 27th March 2018.

In 2017 the UK was subject to five separate and significant terrorist related events. The scale, nature and consequences of the Manchester Arena attack were unprecedented in Greater Manchester with a disproportionate impact on our children and young people. The UK threat level from international terrorism at the time of commissioning the review was at 'Severe' and, in the days after the attack, it briefly stood at 'Critical'. This underscored the need to do all we could and can to ensure the safety of our communities, with learning shared and recommendations acted upon as promptly as possible.

At the time of the review, both criminal and coronial proceedings were ongoing, but it was important for me and for Greater Manchester that early lessons were identified and addressed. It was never my intention to seek answers to every question that families and survivors had and still have about the attack, but it was important to find out as much as possible in order to strengthen our resilience for the future. Whilst the criminal and coronial proceedings continue, we need to ensure that we are in the best possible place to respond to emergencies in Greater Manchester. Therefore, it is also important to me that the recommendations detailed in The Kerslake Report are fully considered and acted upon promptly to ensure that the learning is built into our preparations. We await the findings of the inquests and should they reveal a different analysis, then it will be important to reconsider The Kerslake Report in the light of these findings.

Since the publication of the report there has been a considerable amount of work done in Greater Manchester, by individuals, communities, agencies and through partnerships such as the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, to action and implement the findings. The Kerslake recommendations involved a wide range of organisations and agencies,

both nationally and locally, and from the public, private, community and voluntary sectors. They have all responded to my requests for this public report to be produced which describes the progress that has been made to date and I would like to thank everyone involved for their commitment to this process.

The needs of those affected by the Arena attack remain at the centre of my thoughts. I have received details of a wider range of activity that has underpinned the recovery work which followed the nine days' response. A section of this report offers an overview of some of this work which has been undertaken and which is ongoing to provide support.

I remain concerned about wider security considerations at event venues and the issues which have been picked up by Figen Murray, mother of Martyn Hett, one of 22 people killed in the Arena attack. Figen has started a government petition calling for metal detectors and bag searches to be obligatory for big public venues and for this to be enshrined in law under 'Martyn's Law'. Public concern about carrying weapons has only been increased by the recent debate about knife crime.

The Manchester attack (at the end of an event) and the Paris attack (in the middle of an event), whilst very different in nature, may indicate that there can be no assumptions about whether the risk of an attack is higher at the start, during or at the end of an event.

I would therefore like to call upon the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) to convene a national review of security at major sporting and entertainment event venues; to provide clarity about the purpose of security, that will consider not only the security measures taken and required prior to events but also during and upon exit from such events.

To address the concerns that were raised with me directly and in The Kerslake Report regarding the fire service response, myself and the Deputy Mayor for Policing, Crime, Criminal Justice and Fire visited every fire station in Greater Manchester and listened to the views of frontline firefighters. We have worked with the Chief Fire Officer and his senior management team to undertake a full root and branch review of the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and the outcomes of this have now been published in the 'Programme for Change 2019'¹.

¹ <https://manchesterfire.gov.uk/news/gmfrs-reveals-proposals-for-a-frontline-first-emergency-service-that-is-fit-for-the-future/>

The reported media behaviour that families experienced following the Arena attack was of considerable concern to the Kerslake review panel. I note that the Independent Press Standards Organisation is compiling guidance for editors and journalists on reporting major incidents, setting out how the Editors' Code applies in these situations. I remain sceptical however as to whether this will be sufficiently robust to protect people from, or prevent a repeat of, the intrusion and insensitivity that some of the families experienced following the Arena attack. I would also like to reiterate that media coverage of the inquests into the attack must be conducted in a responsible manner, as requested by the coroner's court and in keeping and adherence to the Editors' Code.

Alongside the independent review chaired by Lord Kerslake, I also commissioned an expert panel led by Councillor Rishi Shori, Leader of Bury Council, to review the work that was being undertaken in the city-region to tackle and confront hateful extremism in all its forms and from wherever it emanates. Findings of this review can be found in 'A Shared Future: A Report of Greater Manchester Preventing Hateful Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Commission'² and the recommendations are also being implemented in Greater Manchester.

This report demonstrates the commitment in Greater Manchester and beyond to implement the learning from The Kerslake Report. The work is ongoing, as is engagement with central Government where recommendations require changes to national policies. I am proud of how everyone in Greater Manchester responded but I know that we have more to learn from this horrific event and we will do all we can to strengthen even further our emergency response and the resilience of our communities.



Andy Burnham
Mayor of Greater Manchester

² <https://www.greatermanchester-ca.gov.uk/what-we-do/communities/preventing-hateful-extremism-and-promoting-social-cohesion-commission/>

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Kerslake Report was produced following an independent review into the preparedness for and response to the Manchester Arena attack. The review was commissioned by the Mayor of Greater Manchester in exercise of his role as Police and Crime Commissioner. The immediate response covered the nine days that followed the attack in May 2017. Whilst the report highlighted what went well during the response, it focused primarily on learning lessons from what went less well, putting the experiences of those caught up in the attack at the centre of the review's deliberations.
2. Now some 12 months on, this report has been prepared at the request of the Mayor to consider how the emergency services, UK Government and other national organisations, local agencies and multi-agency partnerships have responded to the recommendations that were detailed in The Kerslake Report.
3. The Greater Manchester Resilience Forum has led much of the local activity to act on the recommendations made in The Kerslake Report, coordinating the production of action plans, leading the review of roles and responsibilities, commissioning multi-agency (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles) training and organising a wide range of exercise events. Securing effective communication between agencies and comprehensive multi-agency response can be challenging. There is clear evidence that the communication channels between agencies have improved and are regularly tested, and that systems to cascade activation messages within and across agencies have been strengthened. Responder organisations must remain committed to testing these communication channels to ensure that the terminology and language used in response to emergencies is consistent and understood.
4. Greater Manchester Resilience Forum now includes the early calling of a Strategic Coordination Group in its plans and training, including that delivered by the College of Policing and the Emergency Planning College.
5. The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service was the subject of a number of recommendations following a detailed review of its failure to respond adequately following the Arena attack. These recommendations addressed communication

issues, clarity of procedures, operational culture and multi-agency working. Specific actions are being taken to address the policies and procedures that underpin effective multi-agency working. Clarification of command roles and responsibilities, along with an agreed tactical coordinating role for the National Inter-agency Liaison Officers, have been shared throughout the fire and rescue service and have been referred for support to the National Fire Chiefs' Council. A key theme within the recommendations related to interoperability and the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has organised multi-agency and single agency training to test, train and embed the revised roles and responsibilities. Further testing to validate this learning is required. In addition, learning from the response to the Arena attack has provided the impetus for Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service to conduct a root and branch review of its service, and proposals have been released for public consultation. Given the national dispute between the Fire Brigades Union and the Fire and Rescue Service employers, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service are currently unable to provide the specialist teams that would ordinarily respond to a marauding terrorist attack. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service continue to work with the Home Office and other parties to seek a resolution which will put in place an arrangement which could further strengthen a multi-agency response to any terrorist incident. As an interim measure, an agreement is in place with Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service to provide this resource if needed.

6. North West Fire Control had a key role in the activation and deployment of the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service. The service level agreement between North West Fire Control and its partner fire and rescue services is still to be reviewed. However, policies and procedures that underpin mobilising senior fire and rescue service officers and communicating emergency incidents to them, have been clarified. A new communications channel is tested within North West Fire Control and across the emergency services' control rooms on a daily basis.
7. Greater Manchester Police was recommended to review the procedures and capacity of the Force Duty Officer role and the communication protocols between this officer and emergency responders. Greater Manchester Police has subsequently created a number of new roles to enhance its senior officer capacity and resilience during major incidents which will also reduce the task load on the Force Duty Officer. In addition, plans to relocate this officer to the Greater Manchester Police headquarters will be completed later in 2019.

8. Whilst not the subject of any specific recommendations, the North West Ambulance Service has responded to more general recommendations in relation to multi-agency communication procedures, dedicated incident notification channels and the procurement of additional stretchers for response vehicles to assist in casualty evacuation.
9. Following the failure of the National Mutual Aid Telephony system that impacted on the timely activation of the Casualty Bureau on the night of the attack, Vodafone have given guarantees to the Home Office that the issues associated with this telephony procedure have been resolved. Subsequent testing of the system has provided assurance that this is the case.
10. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles training programme also underpins the multi-agency exercises and training events. This is complemented by robust communication links that have now been put in place between responder agencies and these are tested on a regular basis.
11. Operation PLATO (the protocols associated with the response to a marauding terrorist attack,) has been reviewed nationally and new guidance has recently been published.
12. A particular recommendation related to the need for comprehensive contingencies for the provision of mental health services to support adults and children who experienced trauma. At a local level within Greater Manchester, this has been addressed in a collective approach by the mental health trusts through the development of a joint response plan, which is currently with the trusts' boards for final approval. This could include the activation of the Greater Manchester Mental Health Resilience Hub and this joint response plan has been tested in a multi-agency exercise.
13. The accounts given by families to the Kerslake review panel about press and media intrusion resulted in a number of recommendations, specifically one to the Independent Press Standards Organisation (Ips0) to review the operation of its code of practice in relation to events such as the Arena attack. Ips0 has reviewed the provisions of the Editors' Code in relation to this incident and believe that the code, if adhered to, is sufficiently robust to offer protection from intrusion and to

hold editors to account. However, Ipso has recognised the need for greater guidance and has been more proactive over the last 12 months in contacting agencies and organisations involved in responding to major incidents.

14. Ipso has also committed to a programme of work that will include relevant training for journalists, compiling guidance for editors and journalists and also publishing information for the public who may be concerned about press intrusion. In addition, training courses for police family liaison officers are currently being updated to provide additional guidance on handling media contact.
15. The Mayor has recognised that, over the past two years, agencies across Greater Manchester have also been involved in much work supporting those directly affected by the attack and in helping the city-region recover from the events of May 2017. Manchester City Council has led the programme of recovery and Section 3 of this report describes some of this work, but makes it clear that this is a long-term, ongoing process. This section also summarises those points of notable good practice identified in The Kerslake Report. Those points of what went well are recorded to assist other agencies across the country and beyond when preparing for, and training to respond to, attacks of a similar nature.

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION, CONTEXT & METHODOLOGY

Introduction

- 1.1 This report has been prepared just over one year on from the publication of The Kerslake Report, which was commissioned³ by the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, following the appalling attack at the Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017. The Kerslake Report, published on 27th March 2018, addressed Greater Manchester's preparedness for and response to the attack. It identified key points of good practice and areas where improvements should be made.
- 1.2 This report focuses on progress against each of the recommendations contained within The Kerslake Report, setting out where actions have been taken and completed and also where work is still under way.
- 1.3 Much work has also been undertaken by agencies to support those affected by the attack and to help Greater Manchester recover. Although this work falls outside the terms of reference of The Kerslake Report, it was considered important to include it in this report to provide a comprehensive overview of the response to, and recovery from, the Arena attack.
- 1.4 The evidence of good practice that was highlighted in The Kerslake Report is also referenced in this report so that the emergency services and agencies across the country might take account of such practice when reviewing their own planning and preparations for such emergencies.

Context

The Arena attack

- 1.5 At 2231 hours on Monday 22nd May 2017, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device in an area known as the City Room, which is just outside the Manchester Arena. For the purpose of this report the City Room will be referred to as the 'foyer'. The attack took place after an Ariana Grande concert

³ The terms of reference for the Kerslake Report are here: <https://www.kerslakearenareview.co.uk/terms-of-reference/>

attended by some 14,000 people, the audience consisting mainly of teenagers accompanied by family members. Many exiting concert-goers and waiting parents were in the foyer at the time of the explosion. The bomb killed 22 people including children, more than 160 were physically injured and significantly more suffered psychological injury.

- 1.6 First responders were quickly on the scene and a major multi-agency response operation commenced including the activation of tactical and strategic structures at Greater Manchester Police Force Headquarters. A casualty clearing station was set up adjacent to the entrance to Victoria Rail Station and a family and friends reception centre established at the Etihad Stadium.
- 1.7 On Tuesday 23rd May 2017 the Government raised the UK's threat level to 'Critical', a status that would remain until 27th May. Over the following nine days, a number of raids, evacuations and controlled explosions were carried out at locations across Greater Manchester and the wider UK, often resulting in arrests.
- 1.8 Throughout this period, a multi-agency Strategic Coordinating Group, chaired by Greater Manchester Police, led the response to the incident before handing over to a Recovery Coordinating Group, led by Manchester City Council, for the recovery phase.

The Kerslake Report

- 1.9 In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, was clear that important learning from this devastating incident be captured and disseminated. Although criminal and coronial processes will identify learning, he wanted to ensure that key messages and lessons could be shared more quickly than happens through formal statutory processes. He therefore commissioned an independent review of Greater Manchester's preparedness for and response to the Manchester Arena terrorist attack.
- 1.10 The review was carried out by a panel of experts chaired by Lord Kerslake. The other panel members were: The Venerable Karen Lund, Hugh Deeming, Alan Goodwin and Margareta Wahlström.
- 1.11 From the beginning the Mayor was committed to putting the experiences of bereaved families, the injured and others directly affected at the centre of the

review. The review publicly invited those affected to participate in its work and the experiences of those who did so are included in The Kerslake Report. The review team also talked to emergency responders and their agencies, media, business, voluntary sector, faith and community leaders, attended multi-agency debriefs, conducted site visits and reviewed a considerable number of documents.

- 1.12 On 27th March 2018, 'The Kerslake Report: An independent review into the preparedness for, and emergency response to, the Manchester Arena attack on 22nd May 2017' was published. The considerations of the panel led to The Kerslake Report including examples of what went well in the preparation and response to the attack together with areas of learning and a series of recommendations. The recommendations were made to local and national organisations, both in their capacity as single agencies and in their work as partnerships.
- 1.13 Since the publication of The Kerslake Report, many organisations involved in civil contingency planning and emergency response in this country have been reviewing and acting on the recommendations. Local resilience forums across the UK, together with equivalent partnerships overseas, have requested presentations and input to ensure that they can address the learning. In Greater Manchester itself, considerable work has been ongoing to ensure the recommendations are addressed robustly. This report details only some of the activity that has been undertaken and represents something of a summary of the activity that continues.

Methodology

- 1.14 Following the publication of The Kerslake Report, The Mayor tasked agencies across Greater Manchester to review the recommendations made for their individual organisations and to implement measures to strengthen and improve those areas where lessons had been highlighted. The response to major emergencies requires agencies to work together and so any new procedures introduced in Greater Manchester were to be tested and validated through the statutory partnership of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum⁴. The forum was also required to show leadership as necessary in delivering recommendations.

⁴ Greater Manchester Resilience Forum is a multi-agency partnership made up of key emergency responders and specific supporting agencies
[http://www.gmemergencyplanning.org.uk/info/21/who we are what we do](http://www.gmemergencyplanning.org.uk/info/21/who_we_are_what_we_do).

1.15 Many of the recommendations outlined in The Kerslake Report fall to national organisations to implement. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Greater Manchester, together with the Leader of Manchester City Council, wrote to all relevant national bodies to seek their cooperation in the implementation of the recommendations. Their responses have informed this report.

1.16 Under the leadership of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, a specific work programme and governance structure have been established. This includes monitoring the progress of all recommendations to ensure oversight and scrutiny.

1.17 This report addresses each recommendation in turn using information provided by the organisations below:

- Prime Minister's Office
- The Home Office
- Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
- Civil Contingencies Secretariat
- Independent Press Standards Organisation
- National Police Chiefs' Council
- National Fire Chiefs' Council
- National Ambulance Resilience Unit
- Public Health England
- British Transport Police
- Resilience & Emergencies Division, Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government
- The British Red Cross
- Victim Support
- Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Peace Foundation
- College of Policing
- Emergency Planning College
- Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Team
- Northern (Arriva UK Trains)
- Headquarters North West (Army)
- North West Ambulance Service

A requirement of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the purpose of the Forum is to ensure effective delivery of those duties of the Act that need to be developed in a multi-agency environment. This includes identifying risks and producing plans in order to prepare for emergencies.

- Greater Manchester Police
- Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
- Greater Manchester Health & Social Care Partnership
- Transport for Greater Manchester
- Manchester City Council and other Greater Manchester local authorities
- Greater Manchester Combined Authority

SECTION 2: RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROGRESS

- 2.1. The Kerslake Report reviewed arrangements into the preparedness for and response to the Manchester Arena attack and throughout the report highlighted a mixture of good practice and areas for improvement.
- 2.2. This section has been compiled using progress updates from the agencies/partnerships involved. It outlines the progress that has been made in implementing those recommendations, some of which have been fully implemented and others which are ongoing.
- 2.3. Where possible the response to each recommendation has also included the specific impact experienced by the public or other agencies in the immediate response to the attack. Just as the Kerslake review panel sought to reflect the views and voices of those most directly affected by the incident, so too has this report considered the likely public benefit which should come from changes or improved ways of operating by responder agencies.

Local multi-agency recommendations

Greater Manchester Resilience Forum members should investigate ways to increase their own personnel's understandings of their partner agencies' procedures and operational priorities during the first 30 minutes to one hour of a major incident.

- 2.4. For those injured in the foyer of the Arena and the public or Arena staff immediately on hand giving assistance, a natural expectation when North West Ambulance Service personnel arrived was that they would bring immediate individual support and treatment to those injured. However paramedic training and protocols require more wide-ranging actions on arrival at an incident to ensure appropriate assessment of the scene, determination of likely numbers of casualties and treatment priorities. The setup of a casualty clearing station on the station concourse was highlighted as a point of good practice by The Kerslake Report and meant that the injured were assessed appropriately at the scene and directed to the correct hospital for treatment. This essential part of the triage

process was not sufficiently understood, particularly by other responder agencies and was one of the key factors which led to this recommendation.

- 2.5. The UK civil contingencies framework sets out the roles and responsibilities of organisations that may be involved in the response to a major incident. The Greater Manchester Resilience Forum had included these roles and responsibilities in its generic response plan, which sets out the overall principles agreed by emergency services and their partners for responding to emergencies in Greater Manchester. In addition, multi-agency training and exercising had been designed to assist emergency responders to understand their own and others' roles in an emergency response. However, this understanding needs strengthening and continued reinforcement, perhaps especially at an operational level when responders work together at the scene under circumstances which are far beyond those they encounter in responding together to day-to-day emergencies.
- 2.6. Enabling the emergency services to work together has been a core function of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP)⁵ training programme since 2012, which is supported by the Home Office and delivered locally to responders. At a local level and to help address this recommendation, the roles and responsibilities of responder agencies have been clarified and reinforced within the training material to enhance joint understanding during the first hour of an emergency response. This training is delivered in Greater Manchester through a programme of monthly courses. Commanders from the different responder agencies in Greater Manchester are encouraged to attend one of these multi-agency sessions. The focus of this training is on improving interoperability and working together.
- 2.7. Greater Manchester Police continue to include JESIP material in mandatory personal safety training which is attended annually by all operational officers. The North West Ambulance Service has detailed the capabilities and the response methods of all partner agencies in its latest Major Incident Response Plan and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service include this detail within an annual 'maintenance of skills' programme which is delivered for all operational staff.

⁵ JESIP was established in 2012 by the Home Office to improve interoperability across the emergency services. It is built on a set of common principles and models, which, when employed for incident response, will improve the way the services work together. <https://www.jesip.org.uk/home>

2.8. The casualty clearing station was highlighted as good practice in The Kerslake Report and Greater Manchester health colleagues have been working to share this learning nationally. Should this be required in a future incident this is likely to ensure that those affected are better informed and supported.

The future role of the Mayor of Greater Manchester in emergencies should be clarified and included in the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum's plans, training and exercises.

2.9. The Kerslake Report noted the benefits of the visible leadership displayed by the Mayor of Greater Manchester and the Lord Mayor, Chief Executive and Leader of Manchester City Council. This strength of the civic leadership and the partnership approach adopted provided reassurance to residents, businesses and communities and support to those affected.

2.10. At the time of the attack the Mayor of Greater Manchester was newly elected and therefore the role of the Mayor in emergencies had not been set out formally in any plans. The Kerslake Report therefore recommends that the role of the Mayor is built into emergency plans, recognising that civic leaders taking a highly visible role in the response to and recovery from major incidents enhances community reassurance and confidence.

2.11. In response to this recommendation, the Greater Manchester Combined Authority and Greater Manchester Resilience Forum have sought to clarify national expectations about the role of elected Mayors within the UK's civil contingencies framework. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Greater Manchester have held discussions with local emergency planners about how they should be alerted to and kept informed during emergencies, together with their role and contribution in any future emergency response. A draft protocol has now been drawn up and is being tested against ongoing emergencies ahead of wider consultation and the development of accompanying guidance. The intention is to validate this protocol during future resilience exercises in 2019/20.

Greater Manchester Resilience Forum members should develop contingencies to enable METHANE messages to be shared directly between partner agencies' control rooms immediately upon receipt of a message from the incident scene.

- 2.12. The content and effectiveness of communication between emergency responders at the time of an emergency was the subject of several recommendations within The Kerslake Report. METHANE⁶ messages are a standard format for sharing immediately available information about an emergency so that all emergency services have a rapid and shared understanding of the situation at the scene. This format has been developed as part of the national JESIP programme.
- 2.13. In any major emergency there is a public expectation that the blue light responder agencies will attend to provide the required support. Underlying this expectation is the requirement that clear messages about the emergency are received and shared between the respective agencies. Although systems were in place within organisations to collate and communicate information internally, the Arena response demonstrated the need to share this amongst responders more efficiently, in order for all agencies to have a shared situational awareness, enabling timely responses.
- 2.14. Recognising that a common understanding of events is critically important, the three emergency services in Greater Manchester have introduced action cards into their control rooms that ensure that drafting and disseminating a METHANE message to other blue light services is an early priority.
- 2.15. In addition, the existence of a dedicated radio channel is now reinforced by all emergency control rooms to ensure that such messages can be immediately shared. This is tested on a daily basis.
- 2.16. This method of sharing information has been successfully tested during a series of multi-agency exercises over the period October 2018 to January 2019 and this will continue on a quarterly basis in routine training and briefing events.

⁶ First responders use the METHANE acronym to communicate a report in a set format in order to alert other agencies of a major incident. It short it stands for: M (Major Incident), E (Exact Location), T (Type of Incident), H (Hazards), A (Access), N (Number of Casualties), E (Emergency Services).

2.17. Communications during an emergency must take account of complex, rapidly changing circumstances and could be the subject of parallel social media messaging. Additional measures have been implemented to address some of the identified shortcomings, however communication in an environment with multiple information sources is a challenge and therefore regular training and testing will be necessary.

Greater Manchester Resilience Forum members should adopt the common understanding of specific terms and phrases which impact on multi-agency working that is defined within the Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology (e.g. rendezvous point, forward command point, holding area).

2.18. The Kerslake Report recognised that the agencies who responded to the Arena attack were of different sizes and complexities, with different cultures, functions and ways of working. Whilst there might be a willingness to work together it could not be assumed that smooth inter-agency working would always result, especially at time of pressure or complexity. However, adopting the Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology across Greater Manchester will help unify communications internally, across agencies and with the public who are calling on their services.

2.19. To ensure that there is a comprehensive understanding of all terminology used during multi-agency command, control and communication across the UK, the Cabinet Office has published the Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology. Containing more than 700 defined terms; this is now used as a key reference document for the JESIP programme.

2.20. Greater Manchester develops plans for a wide range of emergencies, many of which are described in the Greater Manchester Community Risk Register. The lexicon is also hosted on the emergency services' intranet systems across Greater Manchester so that emergency planners and responders can easily access it.

2.21. A new version of the lexicon is to be released shortly. All Greater Manchester plans have been reviewed and are now consistent with the lexicon.

Greater Manchester Resilience Forum members should clarify their joint operating procedures in relation to the declaration of multi-agency forward control points, rendezvous points and marshalling arrangements during terrorist incidents and suspected terrorist incidents.

2.22. In order to address this issue, members of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum have undertaken a range of specific training events in relation to suspected terrorism or terrorist incidents. Joint operating principles, which include the declaration of *forward control points, rendezvous points* and *marshalling arrangements*⁷, have been incorporated into specific training which has taken place for Greater Manchester responders at two events in February and April 2018. These procedures have also been included within the monthly JESIP training and will be tested during a major multi-agency exercise in April 2019.

Greater Manchester Resilience Forum's Mass Fatalities Plan should incorporate clear roles, expectations and activation protocols for specialist staff such as Bereavement Nurses and counsellors to ensure the added benefits of their deployment would be realised in future incidents.

2.23. Although not specifically mentioned in plans at the time of the Arena attack, HM Coroner and Greater Manchester Police's senior identification manager deployed bereavement nurses to the Etihad on Tuesday 23rd May, in addition to family liaison officers, to support families who had gathered there. The benefits of the deployment of these specialist staff to support families and friends awaiting news of loved ones was recognised by The Kerslake Report.

2.24. Greater Manchester Resilience Forum has now detailed the role and activation arrangements for specialist staff, including bereavement nurses, in the Greater Manchester Mass Fatalities Plan. Bereavement nurses are now an integral part of the response to mass fatality events and form part of the multi-agency planning process. In October 2018 bereavement nurses were represented at a multi-agency

⁷ Forward Command (or Control) Point (FCP): Any service's command and control facility nearest the scene of the incident.

Rendezvous Point (RVP): Point to which all resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed for logging, briefing, equipment issue & deployment.

Marshalling Area: Generic term for an area to which resources and personnel not immediately required at the scene or being held for further use can be directed to stand by.

[Source: Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology]

table top exercise to test the planning for a mass fatality event; ensuring a robust, coordinated approach in Greater Manchester. Awareness briefings on the role of bereavement nurses and counsellors have also been provided for local and national responder agency staff.

Agencies across Greater Manchester should be minded to explore the use of encrypted social media in improving their internal emergency activation arrangements, together with their internal communication systems for updating staff during an emergency.

- 2.25. Public agencies reviewing their communication systems in any eventuality, but particularly in terms of emergency planning, need to take account of the widespread reliance on encrypted social media. This particularly enhances the ability to communicate with multiple responders at the same time.
- 2.26. Responders across Greater Manchester currently use either a pager messaging system and/or a SMS text message on mobile phones to alert staff to emergency activations. Occasionally this is supported by a smart phone application 'WhatsApp' between specific groups of officers to share information.
- 2.27. As a direct result of lessons from the Arena attack, organisations have implemented new procedures for informing staff of an incident. North West Ambulance Service has developed a dedicated staff recall and management system called Cascade and Transport for Greater Manchester has initiated an alert system on work computers and devices to disseminate messages to staff quickly.
- 2.28. In addition, and in line with national guidance, the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum has accelerated its promotion and support for the use of the Cabinet Office's secure system *Resilience Direct* to share information between responder agencies during an emergency situation. This system was successfully used in the response to the moorland fires in Greater Manchester in summer 2018 and in the response to a large fire in Salford in late 2018.
- 2.29. The emergency services, supported by the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, are also currently working with commercial organisations to assess the feasibility of and to trial mass text encrypted messaging systems. If adopted, and subject to

procurement requirements, such a system may provide significant technological improvements to notification and communication processes during an emergency.

Recommendations for emergency services

Fire and rescue services

All Fire and Rescue Services utilising North West Fire Control as their call management and resolution service should review their service level agreements and build resilient contingencies and capabilities within North West Fire Control to enhance the development of multi-agency shared situational awareness, which can most effectively inform their Fire Service command, control and coordination during no-notice major incidents.

2.30. There is a public expectation that in the event of an emergency the blue light services will, once activated, deploy an effective and appropriate response. For the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service this is managed through North West Fire Control. North West Fire Control is a public sector company set up by the fire services in the North West to jointly handle all 999 fire service emergency calls (except Merseyside which has separate arrangements) and be responsible for mobilising firefighters and fire engines to incidents in Greater Manchester, Cumbria, Lancashire and Cheshire. North West Fire Control was set up as a local authority-controlled company governed by a board of directors made up of councillors from each Fire Authority.

2.31. The service level agreement in place with North West Fire Control is legally binding and is due to be reviewed. This will require approval from the North West Fire Control Board. In the interim, North West Fire Control has introduced a number of procedural and communication improvements which are outlined below and are designed to improve shared situational awareness.

2.32. Nationally this recommendation has been shared with all fire and rescue services, and those with similar arrangements have been encourage to identify and undertake local actions.

2.33. A project has been commissioned by the Greater Manchester Chief Fire Officer (CFO) with commitment from the other North West CFOs. The aim is to specifically

enhance processes to ensure shared situational awareness across different responding agencies. The project will review a range of solutions and present options to the North West CFOs to consider. This review will include the transfer of information between agencies, embedding the Fire and Rescue Incident Manager within the North West Fire Control on a continuous basis and the provision of a command support logistics facility within North West Fire Control. This would be activated in the event of a major incident being declared involving any of the North West fire and rescue services.

- 2.34. The procedural changes implemented and additional processes proposed will help to ensure that situational awareness is gathered and shared in good time, both within and between responding agencies.

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and North West Fire Control should revise their policies and procedures (including action plans) for Bomb, Explosion and Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack to ensure that greater emphasis is placed on multi-agency co-location, communication and coordination.

- 2.35. As mentioned above, and linked to appropriate and timely deployment of firefighters and fire engines, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has reviewed and revised North West Fire Control's policies and procedures which are contained in a series of action plans. These action plans relate to Bomb-alert, Explosion, Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack Activation Phase and Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack Stand-down Phase. The new procedures have clarified the actions required in response to these incident types, and reviewed the allocation of resources to ensure that an appropriate attendance is made by Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (with the exception of the resource detailed in paragraph 2.53).

- 2.36. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has enhanced the incident command structure in its plans, to include an officer at Area Manager level to be mobilised to an agreed rendezvous point during major incidents similar to the Arena attack. This senior officer would become the Incident Commander. This will provide the fire service with 'eyes and ears' on the ground and help to inform the additional deployment of resources to the scene.

2.37. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has reviewed and clarified its policies and procedures relating to the National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer⁸ to ensure that they align with the multi-agency (JESIP) procedures and the fire and rescue services' national guidance documents. To assist with the gathering and sharing of information in the early stages of an incident, the Duty National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer may now adopt a 'co-ordinating' role, rather than physically attending the incident or taking a command role depending on their location at the time of the notification.

2.38. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service Standard Operating Procedures have been revised and updated. As part of this, the procedure relating to the attendance of the Principal Officer at the Force Command Module at Greater Manchester Police headquarters in the early stages of a major incident has been clarified.

2.39. These improvements will ensure co-location of all emergency services at both the incident scene and within the overall command structure. This co-location will facilitate better communication and coordination of the incident meaning a more joined-up and effective response for the public. This recommendation has also been shared with all other fire and rescue services nationally.

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should review the procedures, protocols and expectations that underpin communications links between its Inter-agency Liaison Officers, the GMP Force Duty Officer and other partners' control rooms and critical response assets (e.g. Hazardous Area Response Teams).

2.40. The public expect that there are immediate communication channels in place between the emergency services in order that information can be shared and an appropriate response can be deployed in a timely manner.

2.41. To increase the ability to communicate quickly between emergency control rooms a new radio protocol has been implemented using a specific radio channel. This was implemented in June 2017. The system is tested three times a day between the

⁸ A National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer is an officer in the fire and rescue service who is trained to advise and support incident commanders and other agencies on the organisation's operational capacity and capability to reduce risk and safely resolve incidents in a multi-agency context. This officer has a higher level of security clearance which allows sensitive information to be shared.

three blue light control rooms. This radio channel is continually live and monitored by the control rooms and is a means by which critical incident information can be passed between the agencies (particularly in the early stages of a developing incident) in order to improve the shared awareness of the situation between emergency responders and inform best response.

- 2.42. The Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service's National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers and other key responders have been provided with an additional number for a dedicated mobile phone held by the Greater Manchester Police Force Duty Officer. This number is to be used in emergency situations only and provides a direct line of communication, significantly enhancing the communications channels between the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and Greater Manchester Police and other key responders. This mobile phone is just one layer of communications between the Force Duty Officer and other emergency services.
- 2.43. North West Fire Control now hold the contact details for North West Ambulance Service on-duty National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers so that direct lines of communication can be easily established between the fire and ambulance liaison officers.
- 2.44. *Resilience Direct* has been identified as the secure IT platform to share critical incident briefing notes and updates between multi-agency partners. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has carried out training on this platform with all supervisory officers to ensure familiarity. The use of *Resilience Direct* has also been tested to share information and key messages during several multi-agency exercises.
- 2.45. These additional measures will ensure connectivity and enhanced communication between all three emergency services in the event of an emergency. These systems and processes will continue to be tested on a regular basis to ensure they remain fit for purpose and that all relevant officers are familiar with them.

Whilst the Panel acknowledges that Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service and North West Fire Control have made alterations to the role of the National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer and Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA) protocols for terrorist-related and suspected terrorist-related incidents, these organisations should test and further review these protocols to ensure they will be effective and always allocate a ‘command structure’ to the incident and a National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer to act as Tactical Advisor to the incident commander.

And

The National Fire Chiefs’ and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service should revise all policies, procedures and training for National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers and Incident Commanders to ensure that greater emphasis is placed on embedding multi-agency co-location, communication and coordination during major incidents into their standard operating procedures

2.46. These recommendations have been grouped together as they concern the role of the National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers. Linking to the previous answer to ensure that good communication channels exist between responders through being in the same location (both incident ground and command room), improvements have been made to the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service protocols in place for sending a pre-determined attendance to the scene of a terrorist-related incident and deployment of a National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer.

2.47. The Kerslake Report recognised that Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service had been quick to take action to revise the role of the National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer in relation to major incidents. The need was highlighted to give assurance of the effectiveness of the new protocols through rigorous testing. Since the Arena attack, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers have been involved in regular ‘live-play’ and simulated multi-agency exercises to test the emergency services response and communications protocol.

2.48. A number of National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer training exercises were carried out in 2018 and 2019. As well as Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, these exercises also involved Greater Manchester Police and North West

Ambulance Service and were based around both theoretical and practical terrorist-related scenarios.

- 2.49. The Greater Manchester Resilience Forum has developed a revised communications cascade to alert and activate agencies in the event of an emergency. This revised procedure has been tested a number of times throughout 2018 and will continue to be tested on a quarterly basis to ensure staff familiarity.
- 2.50. At the national level, the National Fire Chiefs Council has agreed that most fire and rescue services (including Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service) will use the National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer as a Tactical Advisor. Other fire and rescue services may continue to allocate a command role as per local arrangements. A review of the Marauding Terrorist Attack Concept of Operations and National Operational Guidance has been initiated to reflect this position.

All GMFRS firefighters should be sufficiently trained and equipped to attend a nominated multi-agency rendezvous point during terrorist related and suspected terrorist related incidents.

And

All agencies and specifically GMFRS need to ensure a suitable level of competence and expertise is underpinned by relevant training and preparation in multi-agency command, control and communication for all their relevant staff to ensure effective responses are delivered when normal or more extraordinary events happen.

- 2.51. These two recommendations are addressed together as they relate to the policies, procedures and training for fire and rescue service personnel. The guidance and protocols that underpin the operation of the fire and rescue service when responding to terrorist incidents are found within the multi-agency document 'Marauding Terrorist Attack Joint Operating Principles for the Emergency Services Edition 1'. This new version has recently been published by the Home Office to encompass learning from the Manchester Arena attack and other terrorist incidents in the UK.

- 2.52. Firefighters work in ever changing critical environments and can be called upon at any time to a range of emergency situations. Within Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service firefighters undertake a continuous training programme by

attending lectures, exercises, practical training sessions and other forms of training to maintain competence levels so they can resolve operational incidents quickly and safely. This includes training to attend nominated multi-agency rendezvous points, including in terrorist incidents. In March 2017 a new training facility, one of the most advanced in Europe, was opened in Bury to provide firefighters with 'real-life' scenarios for training and exercise purposes.

- 2.53. Until recently Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service trained firefighters at a number of fire stations to respond to terrorist incidents, training regularly and participating in live exercises with Greater Manchester Police and North West Ambulance Service staff. However, due to a national dispute between the Fire Brigades Union and the fire and rescue service employers, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service can no longer provide the specialist teams that would ordinarily respond to a marauding terrorist attack. As the Fire Brigade Union does not currently support the practice of firefighters responding to these types of incidents, it is no longer possible for Greater Manchester firefighters to carry out practical training either as a single service, or as part of a multi-agency response to a marauding terrorist attack.
- 2.54. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has been unable to reach a local agreement with the Fire Brigades Union but continues to work with the Home Office and other parties to seek a resolution which will put in place an arrangement which could further strengthen a multi-agency response to any terrorist incident. As the service continues to explore options to reinstate a marauding terrorist attack response, an arrangement has been agreed with Merseyside Fire and Rescue Service who will provide a response capability as an interim measure.
- 2.55. Locally, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service take the lead in organising multi-agency JESIP training. A new programme of courses commenced in October 2018 and the objective of this training is to embed multi-agency working. Although primarily targeted at emergency responders, participation in this training is encouraged across all Greater Manchester Resilience Forum partners.
- 2.56. Learning from the response to the Arena attack (amongst other matters) provided the impetus for Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service to conduct a major review of its service and resources. This work has been undertaken to determine

the levels and locations of firefighters and equipment that will provide the best possible coverage to the Greater Manchester public within the parameters of a sustainable budget. The proposals for change were released for public consultation in March 2019.

Greater Manchester Police

Greater Manchester Police, as lead responder during terrorist incidents and on behalf of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, should review the procedures and protocols underpinning the expectations placed on direct communications links between the Greater Manchester Police Force Duty Officer and other partners' control rooms and critical response assets (e.g. Inter-Agency Liaison Officers).

And

Greater Manchester Police, as lead responder during terrorist incidents and on behalf of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum, should review the technical capability and capacity of communications links between the Greater Manchester Police Force Duty Officer and other partners' control rooms and critical response assets (e.g. Inter-Agency Liaison Officers).

And

Greater Manchester Police should initiate a robust testing procedure to ensure the ongoing suitability and resilience of its multi-agency emergency call-out procedures to ensure all relevant agencies receive timely notification of and activation in an incident.

2.57. There is a public expectation that in the event of an emergency the blue light services will, once activated, deploy an effective and appropriate response. As a large proportion of multi-agency emergencies are reported to the police as a lead responder, or as the agency holding some critical information, they have a responsibility to notify and activate partner agencies, particularly the other two blue-light responders.

2.58. Greater Manchester Police and other responding agencies have made significant progress with the development of a new notification cascade process following a major incident which gives clear responsibilities for informing agencies of a major incident in Greater Manchester.

2.59. In addition, revised protocols have been introduced for Greater Manchester Police's Force Duty Officer which includes action cards setting out key tasks to be completed in terms of communications with other responders. These cards also enable the Duty Officer to delegate appropriate tasks to other control room staff.

2.60. To facilitate these new arrangements, Greater Manchester Police and partner agencies have worked together to enhance the links between control rooms and the links to liaison officers. The adoption by all blue light services of a common dedicated radio channel now provides the means to immediately notify each other of a major incident.

2.61. As noted earlier, Greater Manchester Police, with the other emergency services, is exploring the use of a commercial tool which, if adopted, may provide improvements to the notification and communication processes.

Greater Manchester Police should develop sufficient senior-officer capacity and capability to ensure that single officers are not required to manage multiple strategic roles simultaneously during major incidents.

2.62. Greater Manchester Police has created a new Force Critical Incident Manager (CIM) role which will provide additional support to both the Force Duty Officer and to senior commanders in the service. This role will be at chief inspector level and will operate 24/7 across a team of specially trained officers. Officers have been recruited and are currently in the process of being trained, with a go-live date of April 2019. Additionally, to support the senior command team, six officers (chief superintendent and experienced superintendent level) have been selected to be trained to Strategic Firearms Commander level to provide resilience to the existing cohort. These measures should ensure that there is greater depth and resilience within Greater Manchester Police at the right level to manage future incidents.

Greater Manchester Police should review its Force Duty Officer protocols to identify ways to reduce the task load placed on the Force Duty Officer during major incidents.

2.63. During a major emergency the Force Duty Officer has a major role in safeguarding the public and in this instance, because of the scale and demands of this attack, the burden and multitude of tasks required of this officer placed significant demands on their capacity.

2.64. The measures detailed above which include action cards, interoperability radio channel and additional specialist staff, will all contribute to a reduction in demand on the Force Duty Officer. In addition, the role of the Force Duty Supervisor has been further clarified and reinforced through training, and this will enable this role to better support the Force Duty Officer and accept delegated tasks.

Greater Manchester Police should continue with its plans to relocate the Force Duty Officer into the Greater Manchester Police Headquarters building.

2.65. Greater Manchester Police agree that the move of the Force Duty Officer to Greater Manchester headquarters will have benefits in terms of the command and control of future major incidents and the overall response to the public. Greater Manchester Police is progressing with its plans to relocate this role alongside support staff and communications systems. This move is due to be completed later this year and will enhance timely and detailed handovers between the Force Duty Officer and the multi-agency response.

Recommendations for national emergency response arrangements

Government

In order to safeguard the future integrity of the National Mutual Aid Telephony system, the Home Office should urgently secure appropriate guarantees from Vodafone that the necessary fall-back and disaster recovery arrangements are in place to address the failures which occurred on 22nd/23rd May 2017.

2.66. On the night of the Arena attack, the public experienced significant difficulties because of the failure of the National Mutual Aid Telephony arrangements. In particular families were especially upset and frustrated, having to make multiple calls and having to repeat everything several times in their efforts to get information about their loved ones.

2.67. Shortly after the incident in Manchester, the Home Office received guarantees from Vodafone that the problems associated with the telephony issue which impacted upon the timely activation of the Casualty Bureau had been resolved. The Home Office continues to maintain an ongoing review of the system to identify any further service improvements. Notwithstanding such improvements, the Home Office, together with Vodafone, are introducing a resilient back up service in the case of a catastrophic failure on the system servers. Vodafone now monitor news feeds and will put their teams on standby if they believe the National Mutual Aid Telephony system may be invoked.

2.68. The National Mutual Aid Telephone system was fully tested the following month in response to the tragic events at Grenfell Tower in London and no issues were experienced. Additionally, Thames Valley Police conduct a test of the system every month and there have been no failures of the system. This test has been conducted every month following the Arena attack. Whilst this system will not in itself fully resolve the issue of callers having to repeat some information, the introduction of the Major Incident Police Portal and other technical improvements will assist in linking calls.

Operation PLATO should be reviewed and modified as deemed necessary to inform the response to any form of terrorist attack and be referred to as the Joint Operating Principles for Responding to a Terrorist Attack, regardless of whether firearms are thought to be involved.

2.69. Clarity about the nature of a terrorist incident in which the public are at risk is key, and the Kerslake review panel was concerned that the use of the designation Operation Plato which indicated the possibility of a marauding terrorist firearms attack could lead to confusion and inhibit the most appropriate response to the actual situation.

2.70. The Home Office Joint Operational Working Group, have now reviewed the arrangements for the response to marauding terrorist attacks in light of all the attacks in 2017, including learning from Manchester. A new version of the 'Marauding Terrorist Attack Joint Operating Principles for the Emergency Services Edition 1' has been developed. This recognises that a range of attack methodologies have been employed in the UK and therefore removes the focus

from any one single incident type. This revised document was published in March 2019.

The Ministry of Defence should review its procedures for authorising Military Assistance to Civil Authorities requests, for operations which will foreseeably require unvarying resources to be in place for durations beyond 24 hours.

2.71. Following a review and a comprehensive lessons identified process, the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office have confirmed that the existing Military Aid to the Civil Authorities process does not hinder operational demand and is considered to be appropriate for authorising the deployment of specialist assets. There is considerable investment in joint civilian-military training and exercising at the national and local levels during which the military aid process is tested. This is supported by an extensive programme of briefings to raise awareness and understanding of the procedures, delivered by an army officer from the local regional headquarters.

The response to the Arena attack provided an extraordinary validation of the ongoing work within the UK civil protection sector to embed the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Framework into practice. Where responders were able rapidly to co-locate, communicate and coordinate their activities, situational awareness was usefully shared, risks were jointly assessed, and pragmatic solutions were developed to mitigate severe, time-critical, challenges. Where unforeseen limitations in guidance, protocol and circumstance collided to block such close collaboration, the response of the organisation affected was paralysed for a crucial period. Accordingly, it is the Panel's belief that the findings of the Review should provide a critical stimulus for responders nationally to reassess all plans and protocols that include assumptions of interoperability during major incidents; for the response to the Arena attack provides undeniable evidence that such assumptions need to be vigorously tested.

2.72. The JESIP programme continues to improve multi-agency working between responders and lessons are shared through the Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) online platform. In addition to local training for commanders, all of Greater Manchester Resilience Forum's multi-agency plans and protocols are aligned to JESIP principles and these continue to be tested and refined. Senior officers from

Manchester City Council have also shared lessons regarding interoperability through a number of regional and national briefing and learning events.

A national review of the possibility of accrediting charities to deliver effective services in the response to an emergency should be undertaken, avoiding the accreditation process becoming too burdensome for the charities concerned but including a requirement to plan with Local Resilience Fora ahead of emergencies.

And

That any national review of voluntary sector engagement in an emergency response consider how to accredit specialist and local charities without making this too burdensome for the charities concerned.

2.73. People should be supported in their local communities and local communities should be empowered to respond, recover and become more resilient. The Red Cross is supporting non-emergency voluntary sector and community organisations to ensure they are integrated into the emergency structures and trained to be able to respond to an emergency.

2.74. The Charity Commission coordinated a review in partnership with the Red Cross and a range of national and local charities with direct experience of responding to the emergencies of 2017. This review has proposed a Voluntary and Community Sector National Critical Incident Response Framework recommending the establishment of a National Emergencies Trust and a Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) Strategic Group for Emergency Response and Recovery (SGERR) to ensure the lessons for the sector from 2017 are delivered. The SGERR in conjunction with National Emergencies Trust aims to improve the co-ordination across the sector for an effective, joined up and person-centred approach in preparing for, responding to or recovering from any national disaster or critical incident.

2.75. In Greater Manchester, as part of the local resilience forum, a Third Sector working group, chaired by the Red Cross, has produced a series of profiles and a matrix of capabilities and services that each charity member can offer when a crisis occurs. For example, the Ministry of Justice and Association of Police and Crime Commissioners are working on a new commissioning model for the Peace

Foundation's terrorism victim services. Victim Support have revised their national major incident plan and brought in more training on trauma response.

The work being undertaken by the Home Office Victims of Terrorism Unit to identify and consolidate pathways of support to those affected by terrorist attacks draws on the experiences from Manchester in informing their work, and includes producing clear guidance and practical advice. This advice should be made available by the Home Office for victims of terrorism and be widely publicised.

2.76. The Government's Victims of Terrorism Unit has published a victims' pathway to help provide information and support for individuals affected by terrorist attacks and this is available online at victimsofterrorism.campaign.gov.uk. This specifically mentions the work and services of the Red Cross, Victim Support and the Peace Foundation's Survivors' Assistance Network. These charities recognised for providing support to those affected in the Manchester Arena attack. Victim Support has worked with the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the Home Office to push for every area to have an explanation of what their local victim service does built into their resilience plans including up to date information on how to get in touch with them.

Consideration should be given by the Home Secretary as to what support could be made available nationally through statutory funding for those affected directly by a terrorist attack.

2.77. Victims can access a range of financial assistance through the charitable sector and via the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. The Ministry of Justice is working with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority to ensure the process is as smooth as possible.

2.78. Through funding available to the Police and Crime Commissioner, direct financial support to people caught up in the Arena attack was channelled through contracts with organisations such as Victim Support and other voluntary sector agencies including Forever Manchester Disaster Relief Fund and the Red Cross through the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund. As detailed above, the review initiated by the Charity Commission and led by the Red Cross into how the voluntary sector

can best respond in the event of future disasters and emergencies aims to establish the National Emergencies Trust to coordinate fundraising and enable support to those affected directly by a terrorist attack or major emergency.

Based on good practice reported to the Panel, consideration should be given for a national tribute sites protocol to be developed and incorporated as part of emergency plans.

2.79. As part of the revision of emergency management guidance, the Government has expanded on its existing guidance around how people choose to mark tragic events. The management of the tributes in St Ann's Square in Manchester following the Arena attack was one of the points highlighted in the 'what went well' part of The Kerslake Report. This is also something that families have particularly commented on. The management of the site, the sensitive manner in which tributes were finally removed and the development of the Manchester Together Archive in the City Art Gallery, have been shared at a number of national learning events and briefings.

Local resilience forums

Potential Strategic Coordinating Group Chairs should pursue a clear objective to undertake a Strategic Coordinating Group update briefing (physically or virtually) within two hours of the declaration of a major incident.

2.80. A Strategic Coordinating Group meeting is designed to bring senior commanders from across all responding organisations together to ensure a shared understanding of the emergency situation, enable collaboration on key decisions affecting several agencies, develop a joint strategy to guide frontline responders, identify longer term risks and resourcing issues and to agree structures and arrangements to support the response.

2.81. The requirement to undertake a Strategic Coordinating Group in a timely manner and as soon as reasonably practicable upon declaration of a major incident, is a long-accepted principle and is included within Greater Manchester's contingency response plans. In practice, in a timely manner is dependent upon the size, scale and type of incident and may not always be achievable within a specified time

frame. Such an approach contributes to a better coordinated and more effective response to an emergency situation.

- 2.82. The recommendation to hold a meeting within two hours of a major incident has been discussed with national experts including the College of Policing and Emergency Planning College who provide national training in relation to strategic emergency response and are the training providers to Greater Manchester's strategic commanders. The principle of holding a Strategic Coordinating Group promptly but not within a specified timeframe, is within the doctrine of all parties consulted.

The Transport Cell is a critically important component of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum's plan. It provides critical business continuity and recovery support and should be adopted as national good practice.

- 2.83. Managing the transport network during an emergency, enabling the effective deployment of emergency response vehicles and personnel and restoring transport arrangements as quickly as possible thereafter is essential to public confidence in local planning for responses to and recovery from any emergency. Civil Contingencies Secretariat recognise the importance of including the Transport Cell in both planning and response, including presence within the Strategic Coordination Centre.
- 2.84. In the week following the Arena attack, Transport for Greater Manchester led the Transport Cell (which included Arriva Rail North as the station facilities operator, Network Rail as the infrastructure owner and British Transport Police) which formed part of the established multi-agency command and control. The Transport Cell remains an integral part of the response structures in Greater Manchester and its activation arrangements are clearly set out within contingency plans. The concept will continue to be tested in future training and exercise events.
- 2.85. Transport for Greater Manchester has committed to sharing best practice around the Transport Cell and has delivered presentations to Transport for London, the Department for Transport, the Rail Delivery Group, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Local Resilience Forum, the Armed Forces, the Urban Transport Group and a delegation from Hong Kong.

All Local Resilience Fora should review their planning assumptions and expectations in relation to multi-agency communications during major incidents. Emphasis should be placed on identifying potential single points of failure in communication networks (i.e. technological and command) and building in resilience and/or alternative contingencies to avoid such failures.

2.86. As mentioned in paragraphs 2.15 and 2.60 above, more robust communication links between responder agencies have now been implemented and these are tested on a regular basis. It has also been recognised as good practice for tactical commanders to conduct regular 'round the room updates' when deployed within the Force Command Module at Greater Manchester Police Force Headquarters and contingency plans and training have been amended to include this requirement. Also, Greater Manchester has further developed the concept of a multi-agency support team which provides information and administrative support to commanders within the Force Command Module. Agency volunteers have been identified and training conducted and the multi-agency support team arrangements went live in April 2018 and have been tested and shown to be very effective during the moorland fires of June 2018.

2.87. At national level, the Resilience Telecommunications team in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat works closely with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, as well as industry experts, to develop the UK's ability to secure the communications infrastructure and identify gaps in capabilities.

The concept of Suitably Qualified Experienced and Empowered Personnel should be integrated into the doctrine, language and training regimes of all Local Resilience Fora.

2.88. Each responder agency maintains a cohort of trained and experienced staff who are able to respond at the operational, tactical and strategic level during a multi-agency major incident. In many organisations staff are encouraged to maintain continuing professional development records in line with national occupational standards appropriate to their grade/function. This regime is underpinned by a Greater Manchester Resilience Forum training governance process that ensures that training delivery adheres to national standards and guidelines and that

competency is met and maintained. Development of staff is encouraged and is supported through the shadowing and mentoring of experienced staff and through mandatory continuous professional development sessions. Work is also ongoing to ensure that agencies embed a culture of trust and empowerment amongst its responders. The Red Cross has reviewed its own internal processes and created new system which are being implemented to ensure that it can deploy Suitably Qualified, Experienced and Empowered Personnel to incidents.

2.89. This concept of Suitably Qualified, Experienced and Empowered Personnel features in a number of the new National Resilience Standards and is advocated by the Emergency Planning College and Multi-agency Gold Incident Command Course.

Operators of all key/iconic sites should be actively encouraged and enabled to participate in Local Resilience Forum planning, training and exercising.

2.90. The security arrangements at all major venues, in particular entering and exiting procedures, are a matter of significant public concern and will be the subject of consideration in forthcoming Inquests.

2.91. Routine engagement with operators of key sites across Greater Manchester is conducted by responder agencies and specialist police staff such as counter-terrorist security advisors. Agencies gather relevant information about key sites and develop appropriate plans and also exercise at venues, in cooperation with site management and staff. Previous and future training and exercise events have and will continue to include relevant operators' sites, building on a range of briefings and shared learning that followed after May 2017. The involvement of staff from key iconic sites is encouraged nationally by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat through inclusion in the Emergency Preparedness guidance and Resilience Standards.

The benefits accrued by the long-term investment in local authority and police neighbourhood and community engagement teams should be preserved where possible by consistent partnership resourcing.

2.92. Investment in community engagement delivered real and tangible benefits following the attack in Greater Manchester. The matter of continued investment in

such activity is now being taken forward as part of a comprehensive action plan which was produced following the publication of the Greater Manchester Preventing Hateful Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Report in July 2018. This work will continue to be discharged through police and crime structures and also relevant local authority and other agency work. The Red Cross is supporting non-emergency voluntary sector and community organisations to support their integration into emergency response. This activity includes providing direct emergency response training to voluntary and community sector organisations, such as Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid. Further detail about the resources and work delivered in Greater Manchester as part of the community recovery work is in Section 3 of this report.

- 2.93. Civil Contingencies Secretariat will shortly release a Community Resilience Standard which advocates the use of community networks to diversify the way in which responders interact and engage with communities during the preparedness, response and recovery from emergencies. Guidance to assist resilience practitioners develop the way they build resilience within communities is due to be published in 2019 and this has taken into account leading practice and considerations identified in a number of recent emergencies.

Health services

Public Health England's guidance on vaccination as a result of blood-borne virus risks in similar incidents should be recirculated nationally.

- 2.94. Implantation of human body projectiles is a recognised complication of bomb injuries and can create a potential risk of transmission of blood borne viruses (BBVs). On the morning following the blast, Public Health England published and distributed guidance on BBV transmission to all emergency departments in the North West and to all GPs in England, Scotland and Wales. This guidance advised baseline blood testing for Hepatitis B, C and HIV and repeat testing at 3 and 6 months as well as a course of post-exposure hepatitis B vaccination. Thereafter Public Health England co-ordinated the identification and follow up of all patients identified at risk of blood borne viruses, with NHS Trusts and primary care.

- 2.95. Bacterial infections following blast injuries was another identified risk and early in the response, clinicians identified a need for guidance on antibiotic prophylaxis which addressed the specific characteristics of the blast. Public Health England coordinated the production of guidance for rapid dissemination to reduce the risk of secondary bacterial infections. With local microbiology colleagues, Public Health England, Defence Medicine, and the web publishing team, the group were able to draft, review and publish the guidance online within 24 hours. This was then circulated throughout the UK using local and national clinical networks, with support from NHS England, and used to provide appropriate preventative treatment to victims as part of the recovery process.
- 2.96. Management of BBV risk in victims of significant blast or multiple victim attacks creating penetrating injuries (Hepatitis B, C and HIV) was included in the recently published *Gent N, & Milton R, editors. CRBN incidents: clinical management & health protection. 2nd ed. London: Public Health England; 2018. PHE Publications gateway number 2018080*. This also includes the Antimicrobial Prophylaxis Guidance for Bomb Blast Victims developed during the response to the Manchester Arena Attack. This national guidance has been widely distributed across the health sector and is publicly available on the Government' publication website.⁹

NHS participants in the Review told the Panel that some colleagues were not aware previously of their role in the collection and preservation of forensic evidence. It is the Panel's supposition that this partial awareness will be similar across the United Kingdom and the Panel recommends that this should be addressed.

- 2.97. Although the hospitals in Greater Manchester received widespread praise for the services they provided following the Arena attack, the gathering of evidence to support any criminal investigation is of considerable interest to the public and particularly those caught up in the incident.
- 2.98. Greater Manchester Police has developed a document entitled 'Guide to Packaging Evidence from a Major Incident' which has been shared with National Health

⁹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-biological-radiological-and-nuclear-incidents-recognise-and-respond> and <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bloodborne-virus-managing-risk-in-bomb-blast-victims>

Service staff in Greater Manchester and tested during a major health exercise in September 2018. This document now forms part of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum's Mass Casualty Plan. Police and National Health Service staff will continue to work collaboratively to establish clear and mutually beneficial processes for patient identification and evidence gathering and this includes more robust liaison procedures in hospital control rooms. This learning has been shared with National Health Service England. Work is also ongoing to develop a national training package for documentation teams at hospitals and survivor reception centres to bring consistency across the UK.

The Panel heard from NHS and Greater Manchester Police (GMP) personnel about the significant contribution from the military: their positive willingness to share both specialist expertise and equipment was valuable and important in, for example, treating the injured and conducting post-mortem examinations. This approach should be considered for replication in other events.

2.99. The national clinical lead for National Health Service England (NHS England), who led on the coordination of the specialist military health support to the Arena incident, has shared this learning with senior clinicians from across the UK through a number of key briefing events. In addition, the Emergency Planning, Resilience and Response (EPRR) team of NHS England is including information in its training and guidance materials at a local level about the potential for a military contribution to incident response. Some of this learning has also been fed into EPRR counter terrorism exercises undertaken during the year and the military aid process is incorporated in the organisation's concept of operations. All of this should ensure that such support is considered for similar events in the future.

The Government should increase its support for public first-aid training programmes (including those for children and young people).

And

All planning assumptions and training in respect of preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks in public places should include realistic contingencies for public involvement in casualty care, treatment and evacuation within all incident zones.

- 2.100. A considerable amount of first aid information for the public including children and young people has already been published by the government on its website www.gov.uk.¹⁰ From 2020, children and young people will be taught basic first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation as part of the new health education in the national curriculum. This has developed out of collaborative work by the Red Cross, the British Heart Foundation and St John Ambulance and others in the 'Every Child a Lifesaver' programme. The Red Cross provides a range of on-line basic first aid education for adults and young people, a dedicated first aid app, along with undertaking public information campaigns. It also provides a range of commercial training opportunities and targeted first aid workshops for vulnerable communities.
- 2.101. Public involvement in the immediate response to an incident has been incorporated in Greater Manchester Resilience Forum plans and there is an aspiration to test these arrangements in future exercises.

All major transport hubs and public venues should possess and provide immediate access to basic frameless canvas stretchers to enable rapid movement and evacuation of casualties during terrorist attacks or other high-threat or dynamic-hazard incidents.

- 2.102. Many members of the public, rail staff and emergency service responders in the immediate aftermath of the attack, had to use improvised stretchers to assist in the movement of injured people to the Casualty Clearing Station on the concourse and expressed concern to the review panel about this experience. The Panel looked at this issue in some considerable detail and noted that the evacuation of casualties was already well underway when North West Ambulance Service staff arrived and that pragmatic decisions were taken to allow the ad-hoc evacuation process to continue so that the professional skills and expertise of the paramedics could be directed to providing medical care.
- 2.103. Funding from central government for the purchase of canvas stretchers together with public access first aid packs at a selection of national transport hubs and

¹⁰ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/first-aid-advice-during-a-terrorist-incident?utm_source=a953689c-f090-4366-ab51-1b6423784a12&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications&utm_content=immediate
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/act-for-youth>

high footfall public venues is currently being explored. In the interim, North West Ambulance Service is resourced to provide maintained up to date equipment, through the emergency deployment of its 'Public Use Vehicles' in the Major Incident Fleet which contain bulk bags of basic first aid requisites and frameless stretchers. North West Ambulance Service has also recently procured additional quantities of frameless stretchers to enhance its capability. In addition, a number of venue owners across Greater Manchester have made the local decision to continue to fund and stock such equipment. The Arena itself has purchased additional first aid equipment and 75 canvas stretchers.

All emergency services should consider developing a capability to give their staff rapid access to basic frameless canvas stretchers to enable rapid movement and evacuation of casualties during terrorist attacks or other high-threat or dynamic hazard incidents.

2.104. As described above, the 'Public Use Vehicles' of the North West Ambulance Service Major Incident Fleet have frameless stretchers on board in quantity, and additional units have been procured. Other vehicles in the fleet also carry additional stretchers of different types. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has purchased a total of 60 frameless stretchers to carry as part of their standard equipment. These stretchers are versatile, low maintenance and easy to use in a variety of situations. They have been issued at a rate of one stretcher per frontline appliance that would respond to a requirement to evacuate casualties. Mutual aid from other fire and rescue services can provide a number of basic rescue stretchers which can be used to evacuate casualties.

Emergency plans for major incidents should incorporate comprehensive contingencies for the provision of mental health support to adults, children and young people, families and responders.

And

That consideration be given to how National Pathways commissioned by Government can support local response.

2.105. Within Greater Manchester, a collective approach is being developed by the mental health trusts to coordinate response plans and provide a single point of activation and mobilisation of psych-social response. This system be activated as

part of the North West Ambulance Services initial incident alert cascade.

Briefings on the Greater Manchester Resilience Hub to all partner agencies have taken place and the concept continues to be tested and refined during exercises. Each of the emergency services also has in place a trauma and risk management programme of support for any staff responding to such traumatic incidents.

2.106. Nationally, NHS England's Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response team is engaging with local resilience forums to ensure emergency plans have adequate contingency for mental health support during major incident response. Also, regional and local Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response teams are actively reviewing and implementing improvements where appropriate.

2.107. The linkage between the local response and the support offered by national pathways is being reviewed by Health and Social Care partners. Currently there is the National Victim Support Helpline which is available 24/7 365 days a year to support victims of crime, including victims of terrorist attacks. The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) has a responsibility to commission victim support services at a local level. This is the case in Greater Manchester, but the situation varies in different PCC areas.

2.108. In Victim Support's report published in November 2017 they reported working with other stakeholders to develop clear and appropriate pathways of support. The stakeholders included the Red Cross, Samaritans, Cruse Bereavement Care and Peace Foundation. Red Cross psycho-social support team members provided 24/7 support primarily to bereaved families and friends at the rest centre and two hotels where they were staying.

Police service

Whilst having regard to the integrity of the formal identification of the deceased victims in mass fatality incidents, those involved in the Disaster Victim Identification process should continue to take every opportunity to share emerging information with families which would indicate that their loved one is more likely than not to be amongst those who have died.

2.109. The principles arising from Lord Justice Clarke's review following the 1989 Marchioness Disaster remain relevant and forms the fundamental basis of any

engagement with families who may be affected following an incident. On recognition of the need to activate the Greater Manchester Mass Fatalities Plan, the Mass Fatality Coordination Group will be established to coordinate all aspects of implementation of the plan. All members of the Mass Fatality Coordination Group will adhere to the principle of providing open, honest and as far as possible accurate information at all times and at every stage to the families. The families caught up in tragic events such as these are at the very heart of the investigation and the Mass Fatality Coordination Group will do its utmost to ensure they receive timely updates in respect of progress throughout the recovery and identification process. The challenge is that identification can in some instances take some time to verify, as it is vital to secure all scientific evidence and supporting information to confirm the identity of those who have lost their lives. Misidentification must be avoided and where a decision is taken to release the names of victims prior to reliable scientific identification, the Mass Fatality Coordination Group will refrain from the use of the definitive term 'identified' and instead use terms such as, 'feared to be amongst the victims' or 'likely to have died as a result of this incident'.

The National Police Chiefs' Council and the College of Policing should explore the production of an appropriate written document to be provided to bereaved families in mass fatality incidents, explaining the Disaster Victim Identification process and the amount of time needed to secure an accurate identification in every case.

2.110. It is acknowledged that there may be a lack of general understanding by the public and affected families in respect of how mass fatality incidents are managed and progressed. The national leads for both disaster victim identification and family liaison have collaborated to produce a document for families. 'Explaining Disaster Victim Identification in Major Incidents', sets out the procedures and provides explanations to help families understand why some decisions are made, why things may take some time to achieve and signposts families to support services. This document will shortly be available for families once final scrutiny and sign off is complete. Additional work is currently being undertaken through the Greater Manchester Mass Fatality Planning Group for key members of faith communities. The training event will help to improve knowledge and understanding of the Disaster Victim Identification Process amongst faith communities.

Greater Manchester Police's practice of extending the deployment of Family Liaison Officers to those who were severely injured should be considered for adoption by other Police Forces, if such an arrangement is not already in place.

2.111. Following the Grenfell Tower fire in June 2017, the National Family Liaison Advisor convened a reference panel to develop the family liaison response to large scale incidents. The primary role of family liaison officers (FLOs) is that of an investigator and there are clear benefits of the deployment of FLOs to the seriously injured survivors of mass fatality events. These benefits are already known across the family liaison network, however the decision for such deployments has to inevitably consider the scale of the incident, the availability of suitably trained officers and the sustainability of the deployment. The learning from the Manchester Arena attack and other large- scale enquiries has been shared through a national family liaison coordinator event and the national Disaster Victim Identification Network. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioner has developed 'Supporting Victims of Major Crime Incidents' guidance, which outlines the benefits of a dedicated caseworker to those who are severely injured.

In order to achieve consistency in the service provided, where Family Liaison Officers from different police forces have been allocated to families directly affected by a mass fatality incident, they must all operate strictly in accordance with the strategy and associated procedures specified by the lead Family Liaison Coordinator.

2.112. An existing collaboration agreement enables the National Police Coordination Centre to deploy FLOs across different police forces under mutual aid arrangements. All officers deployed under these arrangements meet the requirements of a national role profile that is defined by the National Police Chiefs' Council lead for Family Liaison. Under mutual aid arrangements, FLOs are required to work to the strategy and procedures set by the host force senior identification manager or, on their behalf, the family liaison coordinator. To reinforce this approach, in April 2018 the National Police Coordination Centre presented at a series of national professional development events for FLOs; the presentations covered the requirements of FLOs and coordinators and how

requests for mutual aid are managed. A copy of the presentation has been shared across the national network of family liaison coordinators as well as being shared on the College of Policing POLKA (Police OnLine Knowledge Area) family liaison community page. Future accredited training courses for FLOs and coordinators will include an introduction to the principles and expectations of family liaison requirements within Disaster Victim Identification operations.

In the immediate aftermath of a mass fatalities incident, police forces should consider how they might establish effective arrangements for the collection, collation and retrieval of potential casualty data, during the inevitable period between the event occurring and the Casualty Bureau being fully operational. These arrangements should be made public at the earliest opportunity so that those wishing to report their concerns have absolute clarity about how to do so. The recent establishment of the Public Portal facility for the casualty bureau will help to address this issue in the aftermath of a mass fatalities incident.

2.113. Being able to respond to public concerns in the immediate aftermath of a major emergency and the effective operation of a Casualty Bureau has already been raised in respect of the failure of the National Mutual Aid Telephony System above in para 2.67.

2.114. Significant progress has been made on a new process, using the Major Incident Police Portal, to collect details of survivors and casualties. This has included the development of a new bespoke form which has been signed off by the National Police Chiefs' Council Strategic Casualty Bureau Steering Group and should ensure consistency across any major incident. The public portal provides a standardised hub for reporting, which is supported by police media teams and is used to inform the public on how to raise concerns during a response to a major incident.

The Home Office and National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) should actively review and enhance the interoperability of Automatic Resource Location Systems between force areas, with precedence being given to improving the nationwide geo-location of Operational Firearms and Counter Terrorism assets.

- 2.115. On the night of the attack, armed response vehicles were deployed into the Greater Manchester Police area by neighbouring police forces. These assets could not be tracked by the Force Duty Officer using the Automatic Resource Location System. Whilst the use of the national firearms channel resolved the issue, the Kerslake Report noted that this could have introduced avoidable risks to the public and responder safety.
- 2.116. The National Police Chiefs' Council has accepted this recommendation and the relevant leads have scoped potential short and longer term solutions to develop the capability to track vehicles across geographical boundaries. The leads are now agreeing the strategic oversight and how to deliver this work as well as the next steps and timescales for delivery.

Councils

Standardised contingencies should be developed by all councils to enable an official fund to be established urgently following any future incident that attracts financial donations from the public, as was done in Manchester, to avoid misappropriation of donations and to ensure fair distribution of funds.

- 2.117. The Kerslake Report commended the early establishment of the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund to provide a secure fund into which the public could make donations. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, has welcomed the outpouring of public support and generosity following terrorist attacks such as Manchester. However, it also recognises that there are new risks associated with the ease with which people can establish fundraising appeals, particularly using digital fundraising platforms. These include the potential for the misappropriation of funds, difficulties arising from the wording of appeals, the coordination of distribution of funds, and transparency and accountability to donors. Therefore, the voluntary sector, working closely with the Charity Commission for England and Wales, has developed proposals to establish a National Emergencies Trust as a new, independent charitable body which would coordinate charitable fundraising and distribution in relation to a major domestic incident. The National Emergencies Trust would enable people to know how best to give their financial support in an emergency and be supported to do so in ways

that will help the most vulnerable people, assured that their donations will go to people affected quickly, simply and equitably.

- 2.118. The Strategic Group for Emergency Response and Recovery (SGERR) will have a diverse membership of national and local representation, with strengthened operational capability and resources to transform the existing national Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum. It will provide additionality to the capability delivered by the public sector and other emergency services, and improve awareness and understanding of the role of the sector and what it can deliver in a crisis to ensure a holistic and seamless approach to meeting people's needs in a crisis. The SGERR will be linked with the proposed National Emergencies Trust. The proposals for National Critical Incident Response Framework are finalised and the implementation of the National Emergencies Trust and the SGERR is currently being undertaken with support from national and local government.
- 2.119. Greater Manchester's guidance on establishing emergency funds has been reviewed and updated to take account of lessons from the operation of the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund and the development of the National Emergencies Trust.

That civic leaders taking a highly visible role in response to and recovery from major incidents enhances community reassurance and confidence.

- 2.120. The Kerslake Report recognised that the civic leadership was very effective and moved swiftly to provide reassurance for residents, businesses and communities. This has been recognised as good practice in publications from the Local Government Association¹¹ and from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government with the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives¹² The Greater Manchester Resilience Forum will continue to work to share good practice and learning and utilise national learning portals to assist in this.

¹¹https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/Publications%20-%2010.26%20A%20councillor%27s%20guide%20to%20civil%20emergencies_05.1.pdf

¹²https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759744/181116_LA_preparedness_guide_for_cx_v6.10_004_.pdf

Recommendations for press and media

The Independent Press Standards Organisation should review the operation of its code in the light of the experiences described by contributors to the Review and consider developing a new code specifically to cover such events.

2.121. The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IpsO) reviewed the provisions of the Editors' Code¹³ with regards to the Arena attack and concluded that the provisions were adequate to cover such incidents and that the examples of shocking behaviour attributed to journalists and photographers, that were given by contributors to the Kerslake Report, were breaches of the existing code. IpsO has acknowledged that there is a need to improve awareness of its services and the requirements of the Editors' Code to ensure that it can help in a timely way to prevent intrusion and to hold publishers to account where there are failures. IpsO has developed a detailed action plan to address the issues within the Kerslake Report and is currently taking the following steps to implement the plan:

- In the future, where a major incident has been declared, contact will be made with the associated local resilience forum to inform them of the services provided by IPSO to address potential press intrusion and to offer support.
- More broadly, IpsO has taken renewed steps proactively to publicise its role and work, particularly its 24-hour harassment helpline and private advisory notices, to first responder organisations through their trade magazines and blogs. IpsO has engaged with the Association of Police Communicators and has attended events – including training days and tabletop exercises – organised by a number of police forces around the country.
- IpsO is engaging with various bodies to discuss creating/improving relevant training, to support training provided to FLOs regarding the media; and with the National Police Chiefs' Council to raise the awareness of private advisory notices.

¹³ <https://www.ipso.co.uk/editors-code-of-practice/>

- Ipso is compiling guidance for editors and journalists on reporting major incidents, setting out how the Code applies in these kinds of situations. This is expected to be published some time in 2019.
- Information for the public will also be produced on what to expect from the media when they are reporting on a major incident, including where they can go for help and how they can be supported if they are worried about potential press intrusion. This public information will also be distributed to MPs, reminding them that they are able to act on behalf of their constituents in these particular circumstances, and other relevant contacts.

The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and the College of Policing should review the nationally accredited training programme provided to Family Liaison Officers to explore the opportunities for enhancing their skills in handling media contact with families, without compromising their core role. The potential for collaborative working with the Independent Press Standards Organisation should be considered as part of this review.

- 2.122. FLOs operate as part of the wider investigation team in support of the senior investigating officers. It is expected that senior investigating officers will use the best advice available from police press officers to support family liaison deployments and where appropriate provide advice to families. The established training for FLOs already includes the direction to ascertain if there are any media issues (press or social) and the impact of the press and social media (including digital profile) on the family.
- 2.123. The National Police Chiefs' Council and the College of Policing are currently updating the Authorised Professional Practice for family liaison, which will include additional guidance on handling media contact when working with families. In addition to updating the authorised professional practice, additional trainer guides and learning materials are being developed. This will use learning resources that are already in use by many police services (for example, the Metropolitan Police Service use press officers to present media handling within family liaison training). These specialist areas of policing are keen to learn from every incident in order to constantly review and improve their response to tragic incidents. Formal oversight of this is in place through chief officer portfolio leads and the College of Policing, as appropriate.

Statutory Responders should engage with local trusted press and broadcasters as key participants in planning and rehearsing responses to major incidents to anticipate and test out ways in which families and victims can be best protected from inappropriate press approaches, whilst recognising the legitimate desire of journalists to report on the human impact of such events.

2.124. Greater Manchester Police's Corporate Communications Branch, which has the lead for external communications during the response to a major incident, is engaged with local press and broadcasters through the Media Consultation Forum at which the issue of inappropriate press approaches to families has been discussed. It is the intention to test out these links and arrangements with local media during future training and exercise events. Nationally, the matter of such inappropriate approaches by the press has been raised with the National Police Chiefs' Council and further guidance is expected.

First response agencies and local authorities should review the resources available to their Press Offices in response to a major incident and consider whether adequate arrangements are in place to flex capacity quickly if further support is needed to deal with the demands of the media. This could be done by mobilising mutual aid from other Police Forces and partner organisations, including academic institutions with particular experience of social network messaging and communication. Consideration should also be given to allocating sufficient dedicated press handlers at key sites such as hospitals and the centre established at the Etihad Stadium.

2.125. Greater Manchester Resilience Forum's Media Plan has been amended to take into account learning from the Arena incident and arrangements for mutual aid and press handler deployment at iconic sites have been included. Responder agencies have reviewed their internal press office arrangements and are confident that they have the necessary resources in place to respond to a major incident or that they have robust procedures in place to enhance this capability should it be required. The voluntary and community sector has also detailed its capacity in response to this recommendation with, for example, the Red Cross citing dedicated media relation officers across the country as well as an out-of-hours media team to support requests from partners and ensure common lines in the dealings with various media.

SECTION 3: GREATER MANCHESTER'S WIDER RESPONSE

- 3.1. The scope and remit of The Kerslake Report focused on multi-agency planning and activity to prepare for a terrorist attack (prior to 22 May 2017) and on the effectiveness of the multi-agency response in the immediate nine days following the Arena attack. The previous section of this report has addressed the progress made in implementing the recommendations of The Kerslake Report which focused on areas of learning and where improvements could be made.
- 3.2. The Kerslake Report also recognised that there were points of notable good practice, set out in the 'What Went Well' chapter. These included the benefits of comprehensive training and exercising led by Greater Manchester Resilience Forum; the speed with which help arrived; the civic response; the inclusion of the charity, voluntary and faith sectors and the value of bereavement nurses. The points of what went well should assist other agencies across the country and beyond when preparing for and training to respond to events of a similar nature and can be found in Chapter 6 of The Kerslake Report.¹⁴
- 3.3. In calling for a report which considered the progress made in implementing the recommendations, the Mayor has also received detail of a wider range of activity, strengthened partnerships and cooperation between agencies which has underpinned the recovery work which followed the nine days' immediate response.
- 3.4. The delivery of the recovery activity has been led by Manchester City Council through the Recovery Coordination Group which included representatives from the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum as well as Government departments. This section draws on an initial report which was prepared to describe the first year of wider recovery work.
- 3.5. The impact of the Arena attack spread across the UK and beyond. Whilst the work by multiple agencies working together across the Greater Manchester region is recorded below, it is also acknowledged that they have drawn, where appropriate

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https://www.kerslakearenareview.co.uk/media/1022/kerslake_arena_review_printed_final.pdf

on the wider national, sometimes international, expertise to support the recovery activity.

Welfare and health

3.6. The impacts of the Manchester Arena attack on welfare and health have been far-reaching with those affected, particularly significant numbers of young people spread across the country. The work undertaken has had a clear priority focus on bereaved people and survivors with physical injuries as well as others psychologically affected, including children and young people, public service staff and the wider public.

Support for bereaved families

3.7. In terms of the bereaved, the families of the 22 people who died were each allocated a police FLO and were referred to the Victim Support Homicide Team. Victim Support provided a 24-hour support line for all those caught up in the attack and their dedicated homicide service was made available to all bereaved families. Those who wanted them were provided with dedicated caseworkers who assisted them with a range of emotional and practical support. Victims and witnesses who were not bereaved but injured or affected in any way were also offered support from local services throughout the country. This support continues to be available.

3.8. FLOs have worked with families to ensure their wishes are respected throughout, for example making sure they received information before it was more widely communicated, keeping them updated during the recovery of flowers, messages and other tributes left within the city centre. Families were also supported in accessing the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund (see 3.48 below).

3.9. The Manchester Memorial Advisory Group have invited bereaved families to come together in carefully planned and appropriate environments (e.g. the first Memorials consultation meeting) to guide the development of a lasting, permanent memorial, recognising the potential value of physically connecting those affected. Also to recognise the importance of ensuring those most directly affected are at the heart of the process. This has involved significant support from unpaid volunteers.

3.10. The emergency services have also continued to demonstrate support to the families, survivors and those affected by the Arena attack. Staff helped to facilitate private visits by families to the Manchester Arena and were in attendance at the One Love Manchester concert in June 2017 and at the Manchester Cathedral services in December 2017 and May 2018.

Support for survivors who were physically injured

3.11. Greater Manchester wrote to central Government within 48 hours of the attack with proposals for the most comprehensive integrated discharge arrangements following a major incident. These arrangements included establishing a Co-ordination and Liaison Discharge Team to work with hospitals, the patients admitted and their families. This enabled people to return closer to home at the earliest opportunity.

3.12. In addition, the Critical Care and Major Trauma Operational Delivery Network for Greater Manchester proactively reached out to Greater Manchester's local authority chief executives and Clinical Commissioning Group chief officers, and the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund to seek financial assistance in providing bespoke rehabilitation programmes for the most severely affected patients.

3.13. This is unique to Greater Manchester. The most severely injured adults, and where appropriate young people, received individualised programmes in the Manchester Institute of Health and Performance in a partnership between staff from Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust, Salford Royal Foundation Trust and the Manchester Institute of Health and Performance. The programmes were designed for a minimum of six months to optimise the recovery of this group of patients. People who did not live in Greater Manchester were helped with funding to pay for their travel and associated costs to enable them to attend.

3.14. Additional benefits will also be seen in the reablement programmes of adult patients in Greater Manchester with major trauma through the translation of learning acquired in the Manchester Institute of Health and Performance back into the two adult major trauma centres in the region. Similarly, learning acquired from the personalised reablement programmes which the children underwent has been translated back into clinical practice across the North West for children with major

trauma. The Greater Manchester learning for both adults and children has also been fed back through the National Network of Major Trauma Centres.

Support for survivors requiring mental health support

- 3.15. In September 2017 Greater Manchester Police invited survivors to come together for an update on the criminal investigation and to hear from various support agencies such as the Manchester Resilience Hub, the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund and the Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Peace Foundation. The support that developed following these meetings, particularly for young people is also described in 3.20 below
- 3.16. The psychological impacts of the attack have been significant. Immediately after the attack senior Greater Manchester mental health clinicians and managers met to consider the likely psychological needs arising from the attack and develop a response using evidence-based practice and learning from previous major incidents. The geographical spread, the high number of adolescents and the differing needs of members of the public and professionals were all taken into account and the Greater Manchester Resilience Hub (the Hub) was designed, utilising existing expertise developed in the region.
- 3.17. The Hub was fully operational from 17 July 2017 with mental health professionals from both child and adolescent and adult services offering telephone support including advice and supported referral into specialist services where this was appropriate. In advance of this clinicians had been working with colleagues in hospitals, police and third sector organisations such as Victim Support who were providing direct support to the bereaved and survivors. In September 2017 the Hub began offering online enhanced wellbeing screening with telephone follow up for all those under 16 and those over 16 where clinically indicated. In the first year the Hub has supported 3,281 individuals: 2,170 adults (over 18s); 312 16-17 year olds and 789 children (under 16s).
- 3.18. In partnership with a range of other organisations the Hub offers additional support such as home visits to families across the UK, return visits to the Arena and, through the use of immersive reality headsets, virtual visits to the Arena. The Hub has also delivered a series of workshops on overcoming trauma throughout the North of England and Scotland for both adults, children and families. These

workshops have been specifically commissioned by the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund.

3.19. However, meeting the needs of those impacted by the attack has not been without its challenges. It is recognised that some individuals screened and identified as needing specialist trauma therapy have not been able to access evidence-based interventions in their local NHS in a timely fashion. The experience of the Hub was that whilst many services worked hard to meet the needs of those affected, in some areas significant effort was needed to support individuals into local mental health services especially Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services where demand for services is high. Where particular issues with access to services were identified, these were escalated through commissioners and NHS England. The Hub is currently working with a range of partner agencies to support development and implementation of improved care pathways for people experiencing psychological injury following a major incident, this could include NHS funding for alternative clinical provision where indicated.

Support for young people

3.20. Both Greater Manchester Police and the Hub listened to parents and carers describing the isolation they experienced in supporting their child. There was a strong desire for their child to meet other children who had been present at the concert and had been affected by the attack. As a result, in January 2018 a young person's workshop was facilitated. The aim was for young people to meet others, share their experiences and increase their understanding of the effects of trauma. Parents/carers were also given the same opportunity to share their experiences with others, with opportunities to gain similar understanding of trauma.

3.21. In addition to the groups for young people and families described above, mental health services have worked with schools to identify needs and support young people with the emotional impact of the attack. On the day following the attack, work commenced to identify and circulate responsible and evidence-based advice to anyone psychologically affected. However, there was some evidence of inconsistency regarding how information was shared by schools, both in terms of timeliness and completeness. Educational psychologists across Greater Manchester led delivery of a proactive critical incident response, however there were challenges with regards to capacity.

3.22. The We Love Manchester Emergency Fund, working with the Hub have commissioned an educational animation to show the impact of psychological trauma on young people. This will be distributed to schools, colleges and universities across the UK and was produced with the support and voices of some young people who were caught up in the Arena attack.

Sharing data and communication

3.23. Getting consistent messages to and from those in need, including bereaved families, has been essential to support recovery. This was particularly challenging during the initial stages due to so many sources of information as well as data governance barriers. To work through these issues, a 'list of lists task and finish group' was established to collate data and ensure appropriate information governance was in place.

3.24. Several organisations, including across the voluntary sector, sought to reach out to those affected and provide initial support and web-based services following the attack; existing tools such as Yammer were also utilised to provide a private online platform for those affected to engage with each other. The range and proliferation was potentially confusing for those in need however hence the Manchester Attack Support website was developed. This website provides a central hub for ongoing news and activities related to the attack including the inquest, the anniversary and permanent memorial plans as well as continuing to signpost people to practical and emotional support services, including pre-existing and established online resources, such as the Victim Support website.

Impact assessment and outreach

3.25. A key priority of the Recovery Coordination Group (paragraph 3.4) was to commission an impact assessment to enable a better understanding of the issues and the pathways individuals, organisations and communities would likely follow on the road to recovery. The process included a facilitated workshop on 14th June 2017 which brought together individuals from across all recovery work-streams to map known and potential impacts of the attack over the short, medium and long term.

- 3.26. Critical to the success of this work was the support of national experts who were able to guide discussions and the assessment process by drawing on personal and professional learning from previous major incidents in the UK and overseas. This enabled those leading recovery work to draw on insight into what might be expected in terms of individuals' and organisations' journeys through recovery phases and the implications for addressing potential pitfalls and opportunities.
- 3.27. Consequently, the work undertaken through this process has been hugely influential, not only in providing a clear focus for the services and support required, but also by inspiring leadership of a psychosocially informed approach throughout all aspects of recovery work.

The Manchester Attack Support Group programme

- 3.28. In response to feedback from those affected by the attack and advice about evidence-based principles for intervention following mass trauma events, in 2018 the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund commissioned a two-year programme of professionally-facilitated peer support groups. The programme consists of a network of regional adult and young people's facilitated groups for bereaved people, survivors and responders affected by the attack. By March 2019 14 groups had been established across the North West, North East and Scotland. Each group is delivered by trauma therapists specifically trained in disaster-related groupwork. Modelled on similar disaster support networks the programme's philosophy and approach is in keeping with the latest guidance and recommendation by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence¹⁵ for the provision of peer support groups following traumatic events, with groups being led by appropriately qualified professionals and with supplementary access for people to individual treatment and further support options.

Support for staff

- 3.29. Early recognition of the impact to staff directly or indirectly involved in a mass fatalities event is important and the provision of appropriate welfare support. Following the response phase of the Arena incident, access was available to the Employee Assistance Programme and occupational health provision has been

¹⁵ <https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng116/chapter/Recommendations#principles-of-care>

available within the council, police, fire service, ambulance service, NHS and emergency services control centres. A common model was agreed for trauma risk assessment and planning the correct type of interventions. The Hub also screened and supported staff when requested. It is also recognised that support is needed for those who do not fall under the employment of a key response organisation, but due to their proximity to the scene, incident, or mortuary may require support (e.g. contractors). At a national level, a strategic welfare advice document has been developed as a good practice guide in respect of responder welfare during mass fatality incidents.

- 3.30. The Red Cross has been awarded funding from the Treasury to support the 'Resilient Responders' (RR) programme, which provides more regular psychosocial support for emergency services personnel.

Community recovery

Vigils and tributes

- 3.31. Within 24 hours of the attack, a vigil was held in Albert Square. Tony Walsh's reading of 'This is the Place' on the steps of Manchester Town Hall epitomised a sense of solidarity. The immediate show of compassion, respect and grief continued with thousands of tributes being brought into Manchester city centre as the days went by.
- 3.32. On 24th May, the Leader of Manchester City Council encouraged others present to help move tributes to St Ann's Square, following which staff sensitively created a dedicated space for the thousands of people who came to pay their respects over the following days and weeks, including 4000 people who gathered for a second major vigil the following day. Providing and supporting this space was a key matter, requiring a clear plan, supported by a range of partners and volunteers, which prioritised the needs of the community over operational and organisational requirements and challenges. This included sensitively managing a huge response from the volunteers, wider public and businesses, as well as managing risks through appropriate security and control measures.

- 3.33. More than 10,000 objects (notes, letters, cards, tea lights, drawings, sculptures, toys, t-shirts and balloons) were carefully collected from St Ann's square on 9 June 2017 by 200 volunteers and it was quickly agreed that everything should be conserved, as it represented a single memorial - albeit with thousands of components. All the items have been conserved and sorted and now make up the Manchester Together Archive which is housed in the City Art Gallery. Over 2,000 teddies were washed, restored and have been rehomed to children across the UK and beyond. Hundreds of tea lights were melted down and remade into 22 candles for the commemoration service in May 2018. The archive collection also houses all the books of condolences and more than 30,000 messages left on the Trees of Hope at the one year commemoration event. The gallery is now creating a searchable online archive as part of the city's commitment to remember those who lost their lives and those injured as part of the solidarity that marked the city's response.
- 3.34. The management and co-ordination of other anniversaries and events has also been carefully planned and coordinated across agencies, again with a 'families first' principle considered as the key priority. Decisions made around the continuation of major events, such as the Great City Games, centred on how to make things work, with a focus on ensuring that the city was open for business. A full programme was put in place to support the first anniversary.
- 3.35. The commemoration event on 22 May 2018 'Remembering Together' was carefully planned in discussion principally with the bereaved families, survivors of the attack and key stakeholders including the Royal Family and national politicians. The Red Cross was deployed for the event, based at key spaces around Manchester including St Ann's Square, Albert Square, Manchester Cathedral and along the Trees for Hope trail. As well as a commemoration service in Manchester Cathedral (which was also transmitted to York Minster, Liverpool and Glasgow Cathedrals), there was also an important community event 'Manchester Together' in the evening in Albert Square attended by 15,000 people which involved 80 survivor and community choirs, music and poetry to mark the occasion. Families were able to have private visits to the Arena and also to the Manchester Together Archive.
- 3.36. The Spirit of Manchester Tram has been decorated with bees as a memorial to those who lost their lives. This tram along with others in the fleet provided free transport to those attending the One Love Manchester concert. Northern have

cooperated with Manchester City Council to provide a permanent memorial site at Victoria station.

Community resilience

3.37. Since the immediate response phase, the 10 local authorities in Greater Manchester and key partners have continued to work to a shared set of objectives and developed plans which include encouraging communities to stand together and promote unity and positive stories, build community resilience to extremism and hate and managing risk and increase community confidence to report suspicious activities and hate crime.

3.38. A Community Recovery Group, jointly led by Manchester City Council and Greater Manchester Police, was set up, comprising representatives from key services from across Greater Manchester. One of the first tasks was the completion of a community impact assessment across all areas of Greater Manchester which documented the tensions being experienced across the region. A subsequent plan addressed the following four key themes:

- Challenging extremism and building cohesive communities
- Youth leadership
- Faith and diverse communities
- Schools and the further and higher education sectors

3.39. Actions to support communities and build resilience for the future have been implemented across Greater Manchester with support from each of the ten Community Safety Partnerships. The Spirit of Manchester Roadshows (July – Aug 17) provided an opportunity to celebrate and reinforce positive achievements in the city.

3.40. Working with schools has been a key priority and has included putting in place mechanisms to enable good practice around Prevent and cohesion activity to be shared, resulting in increased confidence reported by schools. This has been supported by 'Holding Difficult Conversations Training' within youth and play organisations focussed on race, faith and difference.

3.41. The Peace Foundation has been able to access funding from the Home Office to work in two pilot hub schools in Manchester to stimulate dialogue and activity

within their catchment communities, bringing together individuals and organisations to support the #WeStandTogether campaign. reTHINK activities have aimed to align activities related to peace building, pastoral care, Prevent duty, conflict resolution, SMSC (Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural) education and PSHE (Personal, Social, Health and Economic) education in support of the objectives of the We Stand Together campaign.

Business and Economic Recovery

- 3.42. The message of recovery was very much that Manchester was open for business. Identifying and addressing the impacts on businesses and the economy has required a coordinated effort by a number of organisations, including city centre businesses, CityCo, Marketing Manchester, Transport for Greater Manchester, Salford City Council and Manchester City Council. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, joint briefings were held by the city council, CityCo and GMP to help provide information, support and reassurance. Early work was also undertaken to determine the short and medium term impacts on retail businesses, hotel operators, transport from Victoria Station, the music economy and the wider visitor economy within the city and city-region.
- 3.43. The Transport Cell focused on the recovery, repairs and reopening of Victoria Station, along with ensuring transport advice was provided around alternative services and road disruption. The Transport Cell supported businesses within Victoria Station to resume trading and enabled the resumption of rail and Metrolink services which established connectivity across the city centre. This step provided a significant milestone for the city's recovery demonstrating Manchester's resilience.
- 3.44. Businesses that were closed as a result of the police cordon were identified and depending on their trading status they could be considered for either Business Rates Relief or consideration for support under a hardship scheme. In January 2018, Government agreed to provide £48k of funding in response to an original request of around £80k to support businesses.
- 3.45. The Manchester Arena remained closed until September 2017. During the period of closure, SMG worked to reschedule events, retaining them at either the Arena or

other venues within the Manchester area where possible in order to minimise the impacts of those events being cancelled.

Communications

- 3.46. Effective communication has been a vital, cross cutting element of recovery to ensure appropriate and sensitive engagement with people directly affected and the wider community to provide advice, support and reassurance. A clear communications strategy was put in place to set out the communications needs in relation to a range of audiences, events and milestones. A collaborative approach meant that all partners were able to tell the same story and use the same language. This was particularly important in addressing issues with use of language that affected bereaved people and survivors.
- 3.47. Initial activity included the media management of the tributes in St Ann's Square and developing a key message communications pack pulling together messages of unity, community cohesion and celebrating resilience. This supported general reassurance and counter terrorism messaging and also encouraged the reporting of hate crime. Tailored communications packs were developed for schools, public sector, voluntary sector and transport.
- 3.48. Messages for victim support, welfare and mental health advice was a key priority. This included the development of messaging for key milestones, such as the four-week mark following the incident as well as supporting the development of the Manchester Attack Support website. Work in relation to the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund included facilitating interviews and providing information about the fundraising total as well as management of information around dispersal of the fund.

Finance

- 3.49. In the months that followed the attack, Greater Manchester engaged with central Government to understand what funding would be made available to support those affected, particularly given the widespread and long term impacts likely to be experienced across the country. An initial offer of financial support from government was made in November 2017. This included assurance that

reasonable costs would be met for the police (c£10m), alongside funding for mental health (c£2.6m) and the costs of the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund (c£1m). Following further engagement with Government, the Cabinet Office took on the key contact role for the Greater Manchester response. On 24th January 2018, government confirmed that a total of £24m-worth of funding would be provided.

3.50. There has been clear recognition of the essential role played by voluntary sector organisations, for example the Peace Foundation based in Warrington and Victim Support in supporting bereaved families and people who were physically or psychologically injured. This has not translated into adequate financial support however to enable them to enhance and consolidate this role and the Mayor intends to explore this further with these organisations.

3.51. Since the attack a number of specific charities have been set up in memory of young people who were killed

- Chloe and Liam Together Forever Trust
- Megan Hurley Foundation
- Eilidh MacLeod Memorial Trust
- Liv's Trust
- Remembering Nell Foundation
- A charity is being established by Andrew Roussos, the father of Saffie-Rose, which will help UK victims of terror.

We Love Manchester Emergency Fund

3.52. Following the Arena attack, people from all around the world started to donate money to the Red Cross or through the Manchester Evening News Solidarity Fund to show their solidarity and support for the bereaved families and people injured in the attack. The We Love Manchester Emergency Fund was established on 24th May and formally registered as a charity on 30th May 2017. All fundraising was subsequently consolidated into the one fund.

3.53. Within 10 days of the attack, trustees of the charity agreed to distribute an initial £1m to the bereaved families and those who had been hospitalised for a minimum of one night. Two weeks later as the fund continued to grow, trustees agreed a

further £4.4M to the bereaved families and for those people who had been in hospital more than seven nights. In August 2017 a further gift was distributed to the bereaved families and further uplifts according to seriousness of physical injuries sustained were made to survivors in September 2017. Trustees worked with clinicians and clinical psychologists to understand the extent and nature of the psychological injuries sustained by many who had been at the Arena in May and in particular those who had been closest to the blast in the foyer area. £3M was allocated to support people with psychological injuries in November 2017. With donations continuing, further gifts were distributed to bereaved families in May 2018.

3.54. In addition to individual monetary gifts to individuals, the fund also supported a partnership between the NHS and the world class Manchester Institute of Health and Performance to provide enhanced physiotherapy sessions to the most seriously injured people, described above in 3.13. The Fund commissioned a programme of Support Groups and also workshops for families and young people across the UK to provide therapeutic support and the opportunity to meet with others who had similar experiences. These groups started in September 2018 and will continue through to 2020 (3.28).

3.55. In total the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund has received c£21.6M and has distributed or committed £21.5M. Gifts were distributed to:

22 bereaved families via the next of kin

33 very seriously injured

52 seriously injured and in hospital over seven nights

82 less seriously injured and in hospital between one and seven nights

380 psychologically injured.

3.56. Over 550 gifts have been made from the fund. The charity trustees commissioned a review of the work of the fund which was published in October 2018. Final distribution of the remaining funds and decisions about the future status of the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund will be determined by trustees by summer 2019.

Debrief and learning

- 3.57. Over many years of responding to and recovering from emergencies, Greater Manchester has experienced the benefits of accessing and utilising learning from previous incidents in order to inform future approaches. Therefore, following the Manchester Arena attack, a debrief and learning work-stream was established to provide a clear focus on identifying learning. Individual agencies in Greater Manchester held their debriefs and then were brought together by the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum to hold a series of in-depth, multi-agency debriefs, to ensure relevant good practice and areas for improvement were captured. This was then combined with the learning found through the Kerslake Report and from learning experiences across the wider recovery processes.
- 3.58. Greater Manchester has sought to ensure that work to support those affected by the Arena attack is enhanced by accessing the learning of others who have had experience of terrorist attacks or other major incidents in other cities and countries as well as from experiences here. Efforts to achieve this have benefited significantly from Greater Manchester's involvement in existing local and international networks, such as the Rockefeller Foundation's 100 Resilient Cities network.
- 3.59. The Greater Manchester Resilience Forum and all the individual partners/agencies who form it, have processes in place to ensure learning is acted upon to drive improvements. The forum's processes have been expanded to ensure all the relevant learning mentioned above is acted upon, regardless of whether the control for or ability to instigate the necessary changes is held locally or at a national level. This learning is also shared nationally through the Joint Organisational Learning online platform to assist other responder agencies.
- 3.60. Senior clinicians from the Hub are sharing learning nationally and internationally both to ensure they are offering the best possible support to those impacted by the Arena attack and to inform planning of psycho-social support in the wake of any future major incidents.

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

- 4.1. Partner agencies and organisations have responded readily to the call from the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum for reports on progress in relation to the recommendations from The Kerslake Report, building on the regular collaboration and frequent training and debriefing arrangements that have taken place in the period since May 2017.
- 4.2. This report, just over 12 months on from the publication of The Kerslake Report, demonstrates that good progress has been made against many of the recommendations, but there is still important work to do.
- 4.3. With 56 recommendations in The Kerslake Report, Section 2 shows that there are 21 (38%) recommendations that are complete or substantially complete, 27 (48%) where progress is underway and there is a clear timeframe for completion and 8 (14%) where further progress is still required.
- 4.4. Notwithstanding the already high levels of readiness and capabilities in place in Greater Manchester, the learning from the Arena attack has further strengthened the planning, training and exercising both within individual agencies and in partnership. Plans and procedures have been reviewed and changes made which incorporate those areas of learning identified by The Kerslake Report. Training and testing of these revised arrangements have commenced and these will need to be embedded through a major multi-agency validation exercise which is planned for early 2020.
- 4.5. Members of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum have fully committed to sharing the learning both locally, nationally and internationally. A major national learning event was held in November 2018 and Manchester's experiences have been used as case studies in a number of national guidance documents and academic papers.
- 4.6. Support to families and recovery from such an incident is a long-term process. Section 3 of this report shows some of the wider range of activity that has underpinned the recovery phase that followed the immediate nine days of

response to the attack and the additional learning the recovery phase is generating.

- 4.7. Important outcomes of the initial learning from the recovery phase are the rehabilitation treatment of trauma patients more widely within the National Health Service; the development of the mental health services which has recognised the long-term support needed for adults and children following such an incident. Although the evaluation of the Hub is not yet complete, there is clear support for a co-ordinated statutory mental health and wellbeing offer to support those psychologically injured. Finally the recovery work shows the critical importance of building community resilience and the work to challenge extremism and build cohesive communities.

- 4.8. This report details the positive response to the call from the Mayor of Greater Manchester showing how the agencies and organisations of the region have progressed the recommendations contained within The Kerslake Report, identifying further work to be done and outlining the wider activity from Greater Manchester that has been essential to the recovery from the atrocity of 22 May 2017.